Do Mahalla Committees and Aksakal courts promote access to justice in Central Asia?

Mahalla Committees are an interesting form of traditional dispute resolution which can be found in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan a similar institution exists – an Aksakal court. Even in Kyrgyzstan there is a Law on the Aksakal courts which sets out their structure, authority and procedural rules. Kazakhstan also has a close counterpart – a local figure called Akim who is the mayor of the settlement and thus part of the local government.

A good description of the Mahalla Committess in Tajikistan are provided in a post in Tajikistan travels blog:

“The Mahalla Committees were revived after the Soviet period and these days consist of a number of elected officials – though the village elders get the final say in who is elected.  Once elected, the person remains on the committee for as long as they are able to fulfil their task.  The Mahalla Committee will work closely with the local Mullah and religious people but is not a religious body in itself.

Each committee member will have a specific responsibility, taking care of such matters as cleaning in the village, weddings, ‘women’s issues’, electricity and water supplies.  The members are not paid, it is an honour to serve the community.”

However, there is a negative view on the system of traditional/informal/communal justice. According to Human Rights Watch report the Mahalla Committees in Uzbekistan are politically dependent and are effectively “the government’s eyes and ears, and a key institution for implementing repressive policies and practices.” At least three other arguments are raised against the different informal modes of informal justice in Central Asia. The process reinforces conservative values and as such tends to place vulnerable people and groups at disadvantaged position. For instance, women are unlikely to receive sufficient protection in case of domestic violence. Related argument is that the traditional dispute resolution mechanisms can be used to promote elements of religious ideology and promote values incompatible with the modern liberal ideas. Last but not least, the official dispute resolution authorities might overuse traditional mechanisms such as Machalla Committees or Aksakal in an attempt to divest from difficult or sensitive issues.

Weighting the two sets of arguments it seems a tough call to tell unambiguously whether informal justice in Central Asia enhances access to justice. Again we come to two competing theories. One states that alternative dispute resolution and informal justice flourishes where official justice is weak. The basic assumption is that if people need justice they will prefer the alternative to the slow, expensive and/or unpredictable justice system. On the contrary, the other theory is that traditional justice can only prosper in the “shadow” of a well functioning official system which provides the right incentives for the parties to look for alternatives.